The Forgotten Children: Same-Sex Partners, Their Children and Unequal Treatment by Hedges, Debra Carrasquillo
Boston College Law Review
Volume 41
Issue 4 Number 4 Article 5
7-1-2000
The Forgotten Children: Same-Sex Partners, Their
Children and Unequal Treatment
Debra Carrasquillo Hedges
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Family Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Debra C. Hedges, The Forgotten Children: Same-Sex Partners, Their Children and Unequal Treatment, 41 B.C.L. Rev. 883 (2000),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol41/iss4/5
THE FORGOTTEN CHILDREN: SAME-SEX
PARTNERS, THEIR CHILDREN AND
UNEQUAL TREATMENT
Abstract: Many of today's family relationships no longer fit within the
traditional one-mother, one-father model. Families created by gay and
lesbian couples are on the increase and the issues relating to the legal
protections of these families remain uncertain. Many state courts and
legislatures have refused to legally recognize, through second-parent
adoptions, the relationship of children born to a homosexual couple
with their non-biological second parent. The refusal to permit second-
parent adoptions denies the children of homosexual couples, as a class,
many of the legal benefits and protections afforded to children of
heterosexual couples. This Note argues that such classifications of
children born to same-sex couples punish children for the actions of
their parents and thus results in unfair treatment violative of the Equal
Protection Clause.
INTRODUCTION
Courts cannot continue to pretend that there is one formula, one
correct pattern, that constitutes a family.' Families today are com-
prised of many different participants including sperm donors, egg
donors, gestational parents, adoptive parents, extended family and
children. 2 As a result, courts and legislatures must face the challenge
of modifying the traditional definitions of family to accommodate
new family arrangements. 3
With the advance of reproductive technology and anonymous
sperm donations, homosexual couples now are able to participate in
I As one court recently noted: "lslocial fragmentation and the myriad configurations
of modern unilies have presented us with new problems and complexities that can not be
solved by idealizing the past. Today a child who receives proper nutrition, adequate school-
ing and supportive sustaining shelter is among the ibrumate, whatever the source." Adop-
tions of B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Vt. 1993); see also Adoption of a Child
by1M.G., 632 A.2d 550, 554-55 (N ;1. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993).
2 See Karen Markey, An Overview of the Legal Challenges Faced by Gay and Lesbian Pairnts:
How Courts That The Growing Number of Gay Families, 14 N.Y.L. Sett. J. Hun. •rs., 721, 722
(1998).
3 Compare Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 315-17 (Mass. 1993) and Adoptions of
and	 VB., 628 A.2d at 1272, with Angel Lace M. v. Terry M., 516 N.W.2d 678,
683 (Wis. 1994).
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the conception of children.4
 Families in which two homosexual part-
ners are raising children often encounter legal obstacles because
many courts are reluctant to structure legal families reflecting this
reality.5
 In families with same-sex parents, each partner may seek legal
recognition as a parent of the children they raise and care for. 6 In an
attempt to attain such acknowledgment, many couples in same-sex
relationships petition for second-parent adoptions.? "Second-parent
adoption" refers to the legal action taken by one partner in order to
adopt the children (biological or adoptive) of the other partner, as
might a stepmother or stepfather in a heterosexual family. 5 Often, the
adopting parent is equally responsible for the decision to bring the
child into the world and for the rearing of the child, and therefore
seeks the benefits and legal protections that arise from such a parent-
child relationship.9
 When second-parent adoptions are permitted, the
parent-child relationship with the "second" parent is recognized while
the parental rights of the biological or primary adoptive parent re-
main intact.°
Families with homosexual parents seeking adoption encounter
legal obstacles because state adoption statutes do not expressly permit
adoption by same-sex partners.n Most adoption statutes require the
biological parents to terminate their legal rights to the child in order
for another person to adopt their child, unless the adopting party is
the legal spouse of an existing parent.' 2 Currently, no state in the
4 See Adoption of B.L. VB., 628 A.2d at 1272; see also Markey, supra note 2, at 722.
5 See Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet
the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. U. 459, 545-
47, 573 (1990).
6 See Adoption of B.L.VB., 628 A.2d at 1272; see also Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at
315-16.
7 See Theresa Glennon, Binding the Family Ties: A Child Advocacy Perspective on Second-
Parent Adoptions, 7 MAI,. Pot. & Ctv. RTS. L. REV. 255, 256-257 (1998).
See 1996 LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, Adoption by Lesbian and Gay
Men: An Overview of the Law in the 50 States, (visited No 11, 1999) <http://www.lambda-
legal.org/cgi-hin/pages/clocuments/record?record=111.hunl  'hereinafter Lambda Over-
view of the Law].
9 See Adoption of B.L. VB., 628 A.2d at 1272.
10 See Sonja Larsen, Annotation, Adoptions of Child by Same-Sex Partners, 27 A.L.R.Sth 54
(1995).
"See Lambda Overview of the Law, supra note 8, at 2.
12 See Markey, supra note 2, at 746. This exemption is termed the "step-parent excep-
tion." See id. As no state permits legal marriage for homosexual couples, lesbian and gay
couples do not fit within a step-parent exception and thus many states require the natural
parents to terminate their legal rights to the child in order for their partner to adopt the
child. See id.
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United States permits same-sex couples to legally marry which pre-
vents same-sex partners from adopting their partners' children under
the spousal exception. 15 Furthermore, in a small number of states,
same-sex partners encounter adoption statutes which expressly pro-
hibit adoption by homosexuals."
When same-sex couples do petition for second-parent adoption,
they often encounter the court's subjective determination of whether
such an arrangement is suitable for the child. 15 The majority of states
apply the same standard of review for adoptions: the "best interests of
the child standard."'6 While courts refuse to allow second-parent
adoptions allegedly based on concern for the child's welfare, such a
decision is often colored by legal and social biases.° As a result of the
courts' and legislatures' unwillingness to acknowledge second-parent
adoptions, many children are left without the protections of a legal
relationship with their non-biological or non-adoptive second par-
ent. 18
This Note asserts that a court's refusal to permit second-parent
adoptions denies the children of homosexual parents, as a class, many
of the benefits and protections that children of heterosexual parents
are accorded. The Note further argues that such refusal violates the
rights of children of same-sex parents under the Equal Protection
Clause. 19 Part I reviews the rights and benefits given to children with
legally recognized heterosexual parents and examines the treatment
of second-parent adoption petitions by different courts. 24 Part II out-
lines the Equal Protection Clause and the U.S. Supreme Court's deci-
sions denouncing unequal treatment of innocent children who are
born illegitimately.° Part III demonstrates that children are denied
essential tights and benefits when both of their homosexual parents
1 ° See id.
14 See FIA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1985); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3 (2000);
UTnit CODE ANN. § 78-30-1, 9 (2000); Lydia A. Nayo, In Nobody's Best Interests.- A Consid-
eration of Absolute Bans on Sexual Minority Adoption from the Perspective of the Unadopted Child,
35 U. Loutsvu.lit J. FAM. L. 25, 28 (1090).
10 See William E. Adams, Jr., Whose Family is it Anyway? The Continuing Struggles for Lesbi-
ans and Gay Men Seeking to Adept Children, 30 INLAY ENG. L. REV. 579, 583 (1996).
10 See Lambda Overview of the Law, supra uote 8, at 2; Polikolf, supra note 5, at 542.
17 See generally.
 Polikoff, sutra note 5, at 547-61.
10 See Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 317, 320; Danielle Epstein & Lena Mukherjee,
Note, Constitutional Analysis of the Barriers Same-Sex Couples Fare in Their Quest to Become a
Family Unit, 12 ST.joi IN's J. LEGAI. CommEnrr 782, 809-11 (1997).
19 See infra notes 187-261 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 26-127 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 128-176 and accompanying text.
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are not legally recognized. 22
 Part IV proposes that classifications af-
fecting children of homosexual parents should be subject to an in-
termediate level of judicial scrutiny. 23 Part V further argues that under
an intermediate scrutiny, a court should find that the rights and pro-
tections denied to these children based on the status of their birth
violates the Equal Protection Clause. 24 Finally, Part VI examines a new
state law affecting families of same-sex partners and argues that sec-
ond parent adoptions are still essential to ensure the security of the
relationship between a child and both parents. 25
I. BACKGROUND
A. Benefits Conferred to Children with Legally Recognized Parents
Children who have two legally recognized parents are accorded
many rights and benefits. 26 In most states, a child typically has a legally
recognized mother and father—even if the child's parents are not
married. 27 For example, a woman who bears a child with her same
genetic make-up is the biological or natural mother of the child and
typically is deemed to be the child's legal mother. 28 The legal father of
a child, however, may be determined by several circumstances. 29 In
many states, there is a longstanding presumption—sometimes irrebu-
table—that a child born to a married woman is the legal offspring of
the mother's husband." If the child is born to an unwed mother, state
statutes provide mechanisms for a child to be legitimated subsequent
to the child's birth, either by voluntary legitimization by the father or
22 See infra notes 177-186 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 187-199 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 200-252 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 253-261 and accompanying text.
26 See Rom:ter H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE, PROB-
LEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW 241 (3d ed. 1995).
27 See id. at 754; see also Uniform Parentage Act 9A U.LA. 171 (1983 Stipp.).
28See UNIFORM PARENTAGE Act' 9A U.L.A. 171 (1983 Stipp.). An exception to this is the
contractual arrangement with surrogate mothers who may agree to terminate parental
rights to another family that usually includes the biological father andsperm donor. See
UNIFORM STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT (USCACA), 9B U.L.A. 135
(Stipp. 1993) See generally In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234-36 (NJ. 1988).
26 See MNOORIN &IVEISBERG, supra note 26, at 239-243.
50 See id. at 239. In some states this presumption is irrebutable. See Michael H. v. Gerald
D., 491 U.S. 110, 117-18 (1989). In other states the presumption is rebuttable by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. See, e.g., Mass. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C, §6(a) (1)
(West 1987 & Stipp. 1993); see also UNIFORM PARENTAGE Act' 9A U.L.A. 171 § 4 (Supp.).
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paternity proceedings brought by the mother or the state. 51 A child
conceived by artificial insemination of anonymous sperm, however,
typically does not have any legal rights with respect to the biological
"father" because most state laws provide that an anonymous semen
donor will not legally be deemed the child's legal father. 32
Children born to either married or unmarried heterosexual par-
ents are entitled to certain financial benefits by virtue of their being
the natural offspring of their legal parents." For example, every state
has statutes requiring both the mother and father to contribute to the
support and maintenance of their children, 34 Children who are born
to married parents have inheritance rights to both parents' estates."
If a child's unmarried mother dies without a will, the child is ac-
corded inheritance rights to their mother's estate," Today, a substan-
tial number of states also provide illegitimate children with intestate
rights to the estates of fathers who have recognized the child during
their lifetime. 37
Furthermore, in addition to support and inheritance rights, chil-
dren with legally acknowledged parents have many benefits recog-
nized at law and available to theni in the event of a parent's death. 58
Such benefits include: payments from a parent's pension; contribu-
tions from a governmental program such as Social Security; or royal-
ties under a federal statute such as the Copyright Act." Children of a
deceased parent also may recover for the wrongful death of their par-
ent under some state's wrongful death statutes. 4° Children with legally
recognized parental relationships also are eligible for worker's com-
pensation benefits and insurance coverage under a parent's employer-
provided health insurance. 41
51 See MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 26, at 240, 242,
32 See Barbara K. Padgett, Note, Illegitimate Children Conceived By Artificial Insemination:
Does Some State Legislation Deny Them Equal Protection Under the Fourteenth Amendment!, 32 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAM, L. 511, 522 (1994).
"See MNOOKIN 8c WEISBERG, ,511prn note 26, at 238-42, 301.
3.1 See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 583 (1973); MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, 5Hpra note 26,
at 241.
" See 'Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 774, 776 (1977); MNooruN & WrisnERG, supra
note 26, at 301.
"See MNOOKIN I3t WEISBERG, supra note 26, at 241.
37 See id. at 241-42, 301.
33 .See Glennon, suprd note 7, at 258-59.
"'See 14.; MNOOKIN R WaJSIIERG, .supra note 26, at 244.
10See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 69, 72 (1968) (denying illegitimate children access
to wrongful death claim for death of a parent is unconstitutional t inder  the Equal Protec-
tion Clause).
41 See Glennon, swim note 7, at 259.
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In addition to these numerous financial securities, a legal parent-
child relationship provides security, both personal and emotional, to a
child.42 If a child has two legally recognized parents and one parent
dies, courts typically give the other legal parent43 custody to care for
the child.'" By being placed with the other parent, the child may be
sheltered from upheaval after the loss of a loved one.45 If the parents
separate, both parents have standing to be considered for custody and
visitation, and are able to maintain the parent-child relationship."
Finally, legal parents are eligible for extended leave from employment
to care for seriously ill children under the Federal Family and Medical
Leave Act.47
B. The Leading State Court to Uphold Second-Parent Adoptions and Further
Progress
Only within the last decade have courts begun to acknowledge
that second-parent adoptions may promote the best interests of chil-
dren." Courts have generally defined the best interests standard as
promoting the welfare of the child with regard to health, safety, and
physical and emotional well-being.49 A number of states now recog-
nize that protection of parent-child relationships, regardless of the
formation, may be the best way to safeguard these interests.5° Further,
in a momentous legal move, one state now legally recognizes same-sex
couples, which allows children to have two legal parents in a legally
recognized union—and all of the protections and benefits that come
with such recognition."'
42 See id.
43
 Courts sometimes may also give grandparents legal custody in the event of one par-
ent's death. See MNOOKIN, supra note 26, at 842-43.
41See generally Polikoff, supra note 5, at 527.
46 See id. at 532, 533.
46 See id. at 534, 537.
47 See 29 U.S.CA. § 2601 (West Supp. 1997); see also Glennon, supra note 7, at 258-59.
46 See Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 318, 320-21 (Mass. 1993); In re Adoptions
of B.L.V.H. and E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1273 (Vt. 1993).
46 See, e.g., In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 23, 24 (N.H. 1987); Adoptions of
B.L.V.B, 628 A.2d at 1273; Polikoff, supra note 5, at 542-44. Courts, however, differ on
whether the best interests standard applies to the adoption process or to the legal effects
of the adoption. See In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071, 1073 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1998); Adoption of Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550, 552 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993).
50
 See 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91 (11.847).
91 See id.
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In June 1993, in In n Adoptions of B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B., Vermont
became the first state to legalize second-parent adoptions. 52 In Adop-
tions of B.L.V.B., two women in a committed, monogamous relation-
ship decided to have and raise children together and agreed that one
partner would be impregnated with the sperm of an anonymous do-
nor.53 Both women 'equally fulfilled the role of parent. After the birth
of a second child, the couple felt that it was important that the non-
biological mother secure legal recognition of her continuing relation-
ship with their children. 54 The women faced a barrier, however, be-
cause under the Vermont adoption statute, natural parents were re-
quired to terminate all legal parental rights in order for their child to
be adopted, unless a spouse of the natural parent sought the adop-
tion.55
In addressing the intent of the adoption statute, the Vermont Su-
preme Court stated that the primary concern was to promote the wel-
fare of children, and not to require that both parents seeking adop-
tion be married.56 The court noted that when the state legislature
enacted the statute, they doubtfully contemplated the possibility of
adoptions by same-sex partners. 57 Reasoning, however, that a child
who has two adults dedicated to his welfare and security and deter-
mined to raise him together to the very best of their ability is a favor-
able situation, the court held that continuation and recognition of the
rights of both the natural and adoptive parent were compelled by the
best interest of the child. 58 Thus, the court upheld the second-parent
adoption.59
The state of Vermont recently provided same-sex couples and
their children further legal protection through the passage of the Act
Relating to Civil Unions. 6° This legislation creates a new relationship
status for same-sex couples, "civil unions," and extends virtually all the
state-sponsored protections, responsibilities, and benefits afforded
through civil marriage. 61
52 628 A.2d at 1276.
55 See id. at 1272.
54 See id.
sg See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 431, 448 (1945); Adoptions of 1.1.L.V13., 628 A.2d at 1272—
73.
56 See Adoptions of B.L.F.B., 628 A.2(1 at 1273, 1274.
57 See id. at 1274.
56 See id. at 1275.
59 See id. at 1275-76.
°See 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91 (11. 847).
6 ' See VT. STAT. ANN. lit. 15, §§ 1201, 1202, 1204 (2000).
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The civil union legislation developed as a result of the 1999 Ver-
mont Supreme Court ruling Baker v. State. 62 Relying on the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, the court in Baker held that same-sex couples can no
longer be denied full and equal protections, benefits and responsibili-
ties under the law as a result of their sexual orientation. 63 Although
the court retained jurisdiction, it left it to the legislature to determine
how to comply with its ruling." After days of extensive hearings and
debates, the House and Senate enacted the new civil union law and
the governor signed the act into law on April 26, 2000.66
As a result of the new civil union relationship status, same-sex
couples will have fewer obstacles when it comes to raising their chil-
dren." Legal rights that apply to married couples will automatically
apply to spouses of a civil union.° A child born to one partner during
a civil union will be recognized as a child of both partners in the un-
ion." These children, therefore, will be entitled to the health benefits
of both parents, as well as automatic inheritance rights, and rights to
parental support." Likewise, both parents in a civil union will have
medical decision-making power for their children, the right to leave
work to care for their sick child, hospital visitation rights, and parent-
ing decision and custody rights. 70 While the civil union law does apply
to both private parties as well as public entities within the state of
Vermont, the law does not apply to federal law and it is unsettled
whether the federal government or other states will recognize the un-
ions.'"
C. Other State Court Decisions Following Vermont's Lead in Permiting Second
Parent Adoptions
Applying reasoning similar to that of the Vermont Supreme
Court in B.L. the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Sep-
tember 1993, permitted same-sex partners to jointly adopt their
62 See 744 A.2cl 864 (Vt. 1999).
63 Id. at 867.
64 See id, at 886-89.
63 See LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, A Historic Victory: Civil Unions for
Same-Sex Couples—What's Next! (visited Aug. 23, 2000) Clittp://www/lanibdalegal.org/cgi-
bin/
 pages/doctitnents/record?record=659> [hereinafter A Historic Victory].
66 See id. at 3-4.
67 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2000).
6° See id.
6° See id.
7° See A Historic Victory, supra note 65, at 3-4.
71 See id. at 2,3-5.
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child." In Adoption of Tawny, two women in a committed lesbian rela-
tionship participated jointly and equally in the parenting of a child
born to one partner. 73 Together, the women sought adoption of their
child. 74 In evaluating what was in the child's best interests, the court
noted that adoption by the non-natural mother was financially impor-
tant to the child. 75 Recognizing both women as the parents, the court
found that the child would receive many benefits, including the right
to inherit her non-biological mother's irrevocable family trust, to le-
gally receive support from both parents and to be eligible for both
parents' social security and health insurance benefits." The court also
recognized the importance of the child's preserving her filial ties with
both parents in case of death or separation. 77 The court reasoned that
the adoption would be in the best interests of the child because of the
benefits flowing from legal recognition and the importance of pre-
serving for the child a stable and loving environment for the child. 78
Thus, although the Massachusetts adoption statute did not expressly
permit the adoption without terminating the natural parent's rights,
the court nonetheless permitted the legal recognition of both moth-
ers."
Although second-parent adoptions have not been approved by
many of the states' highest courts, many lower courts have begun to
follow Vermont's and Massachusetts' lead by recognizing that second-
parent adoptions may be in the child's best financial and emotional
interest. 8° In In re Adoption of a Child byJ.M.G., a 1993 New jersey case
of first impression, the Superior Court permitted a second-parent
adoption by a lesbian partner, based on the child's best interests. 81
The child's biological mother and her lesbian partner were in a
SeeAdopt ion of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Mass. 1993).
78 See id. at 315-16.
74 See id. at 315.
75 See id. at 317, 320.
76 See id. at 320.
77 See Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 320.
78 See id.
79 See id. at 321.
8° See, e.g., Adoption of a Child by J.M.C., 632 A.2d 550, 552, 554-55 (NJ. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1993); Adoption of a Child Whose First Name is Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 998,
1000, 1002 (N.Y Surr. Ct. 1992). The state courts that have permitted second-parent adop-
tions usually only in the lower courts, include: Alabama, Alaska, California, The District of
Columbia, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas,
Vermont and Washington. See Lambda Overview of the Law, sutra note 8, at 2-3, 8-11.
81 See 632 A.2d 550, 554-55 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993).
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committed relationship for ten years and planned to have a child to-
gether.82
 The women agreed that one partner would give birth to a
child by artificial insemination from an anonymous sperm donor and
that both women would raise the child as co-equal parents. 83 The'
court appointed a guardian ad litem for the child and an independ-
ent child investigative organization to determine what was in the best
interests of the child.84
 These court appointees found that the child .
had a strong psychological child-parent relationship with the non-
biological mother and that both women provided the child with "a
secure environment in which to grow and develop." 85
The court, relying on these reports, reasoned that formal adop-
don would not change the child's daily life, but would provide her
with critical legal rights and protections relating to her financial,
physical and emotional security. 86
 The New Jersey adoption statute,
however, only permitted the adoption of a child, without terminating
the biological parent's rights, in the context of stepparent adop-
tions.87
 The court nevertheless found that the public policy of New
Jersey is to protect the best interests of children and not to impose
rigid constructions of the term "family."88
 Finding that the adoption
was in the child's best interests—by according legal benefits and hav-
ing both parents legally responsible for the child's well-being—the
court permitted the second-parent adoption petition. 89
D. State Court Decisions and Legislative Enactments Denying Recognition of
Second-Parent Adoptions
While Vermont, Massachusetts and several other state courts have
made strides to permit second-parent adoptions, many other states
have either expressly forbidden adoption by homosexuals in their
adoption statutes or have interpreted strictly adoption statutes to pro-
82 See id. at 551.
83 See id.
84
 See id.
85 See id. at 551,554.
86 See Adoption by filLG, 632 A.2d at 551-52. The court noted that the economic secu-
rity provided for the child by legal recognition of both mothers would include the right to
support, the right to inherit by intestacy, and eligibility for health insurance and social
security benefits. See id. at 552. Furthermore, the adoption would protect the child's conti-
nuity of her relation with her non-biological mother if the biological mother passed away
or if the couple separated. See id.
87
 See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:3.-50(a) (West 1992).
88 See Adoption by JALG, 632 A.2d at 552 n.1,555.
89 See id. at 555.
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hibit second-parent adoptions." In 1994, in Angel Lace M. v. Terry Al,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court interpreted the state's adoption statute
as prohibiting adoption by a same-sex partner unless the natural par-
ent terminated her parental rights. 91 In Angel Lace, a lesbian woman
sought to adopt the child of her partner without the mother losing
her parental rights.92 The court strictly construed the adoption statute
limiting the ability to adopt without terminating the biological par-
ent's legal ties to adoptions by a "husband or wife" of the parent of
the minon95 The court found that the lesbian parent was not a "hus-
band or wife" of the biological parent and therefore could not adopt
so long as the natural mother's parental rights remained intact. 94 The
court acknowledged (and did notreject). the trial court's findings that
the best interest of the child would be to allow the lesbian partner—
who had shared equally in raising the child—to adopt the child. 95
Nonetheless, the court focused on the fact that the partner seeking
adoption was not married to the child's biological parent. 96 The court
reasoned that while the consideration of the child's best interest was
important, the state adoption statute's goal was to protect the "tradi-
tional unitary family." 97 Thus, because the adoptive parent did not fit
neatly within the adoption statute's stepparent exception, the court
found that the lesbian mother would not be permitted to seek adop-
tion unless the natural mother terminated her rights to the child. 98
While many state courts have strictly interpreted adoption stat-
utes to prohibit second-parent adoptions, in 1977 the Florida legisla-
ture took a dramatic step by expressly barring homosexuals from
adopting children.99 In Cox v. Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative
Services, the Florida Supreme Court, in 1995, upheld the adoption
statute explicitly prohibiting any homosexual from adopting)" In
" See Angel Lace M. v. Terry M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 683, 684-85 (Wis. 1994); see also Cox
v. Florida Dept of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 656 So. 2d 902, 903 (Fla. 1995) (Cox 1);
Lambda Overview of the Law, supra note 8, at 2-4, 8-11.
91 See 516 N.W.2c1 at 683.
92 See id. at 680-81.
93 See id. at 682.
94
 See id.
95 See id. at 684-85.
96 See Angel Lace, 516 N.W.2d at 682, 683.
97 See id. at 685, 686.
98 See id. at 686.
99 See FL.A. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1985) (stating, "No person eligible to adopt
under this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual.").
199 See Cox v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 656 So. 2d 902, 903 (Fla.
1995) ( Cox //).
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Cox, two gay men seeking to adopt a special needs child applied for
pre-adoption classes but were denied admission because of their ad-
mitted homosexuality.m The men challenged the constitutionality of
the 1977 statute, 1°2 filing suit on equal protection, due process and
privacy rights grounds as guaranteed by the Florida and United States
Constitutions)" The court upheld the absolute ban against homo-
sexual adoption, reasoning that such an arrangement can not be in
the child's best interest)" The court observed that the purpose of the
Florida adoption statute is to protect and promote the well-being of
adopted children. 1 °5 The court first found that there was no reliable
evidence showing that adoptions by homosexuals was not detrimental
to the child, and went on to reject an argument that adoption by ho-
mosexual adults may promote the welfare of the child. 106
Reasoning that the statute furthered the best interests of chil-
dren, the Florida Supreme Court adopted the District Court's
findings that the statute was constitutional. 1 °7 The District Court
found that the statute did not violate an individual's right to privacy,
and that the statute did not require inquiry into an applicant's private
life. 108
 Rather, the court found the statute prohibited adoption by
those whom the state knows to be homosexual. 09 The court further
reasoned that the state has a right to examine the background of pro-
spective parents because the goal of adoption statutes is to serve the
best interests of children, and thus the decision to adopt is not a pri-
vate choice.lw
1°1 See id. at 902-03.
102 see id,
I" See id. at 903.
1 ° 1 See Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1213,
1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (Cox 1),affd in part by Cox v. Dept of Health and Rehabilita-
tive Servs., 656 So. 2d 902, 903 (Fla. 1995) (Cox II); see generally Adams, supra note 15, at
603-20.
1 °5 See Cox I, 627 So. 2c1 at 1220.
10° See id. at 1220.
107 See Cox II, 656 So. 2d at 903.
1 °8 See Cox 1, 627 So. 2d at 1216.
1" See id. at 1220. The court did not specify how the state would discover the homo-
sexuality of adoptive parents, but did not need to address this issue because the applicants
in Cox voluntarily disclosed their homosexuality. See id. at 1211, 1215-17.
"° See id. at 1216. The Florida Supreme Court further found that the opportunity to
adopt an unrelated child is not a fundamental liberty interest and thus the prospective
parents were not deprived of "liberty" without due process of law. Id. The court also re-
jected an equal protection argument, concluding that rational basis review was the proper
standard and that the presumption of constitutionality was not overcome. See Cox 1, 627 So.
2d. at 1216, affd in part by Cox II, 656 So. 2d at 903. The Florida Supreme Court did not
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Only recently, the state of New Hampshire repealed a similar ban
prohibiting homosexuals from adopting. 111 In 1987, the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire upheld the constitutionality of the New
Hampshire adoption statute prohibiting homosexuals from adopting
any person, in In re Opinion of the fustices. 112 At the request of the legis-
lature, the court reviewed the constitutionality of a bill prohibiting
homosexuals from adopting and establishing an irrebutable presump-
tion that homosexuals were unfit to he adoptive parents.'" Under an
equal 'protection analysis, the court found that homosexuals were not
a suspect class and that adoption was not a fundamental right, and
thus so long as the statute was rationally related to a legitimate gov-
ernmental interest, it would be upheld. 114 The court found such a ra-
tional relation by reasoning that the state's legitimate interest was to
promote children's welfare, to provide proper role models for chil-
dren and to eliminate social and psychological complexities that liv-
ing in a homosexual environment could produce, 115 The court rea-
soned that children, whether consciously or unconsciously, pattern
themselves after their parents and "given the possibility of environ-
mental influences, [the court] believe [d] that the legislature can ra-
tionally act on the theory that a [homosexual] role model can
influence the child's developing sexual identity. ,,116 The court thus
found the suggested statute did not violate the Equal Protection rights
of homosexual adoption petitioners."?
In 1999, the New Hampshire legislature repealed its ban on ho-
mosexual adoption. 118 New Hampshire's governor acknowledged that
the previous ban was replete with stereotypes and that families should
approve the District Court's holding that homosexuals are not afforded any protection
under strict scrutiny or rational basis analysis of the equal protection clause. See Cox II, 656
So. 24 at 903. Additionally, the court did not affirm the lower court's reasoning on the
equal protection issue —that the best interests of adopted children is to he raised by adop-
tive parents who can provide a stable,. heterosexual environment. during formative pubes-
cent and teenage years. See id. •
111 See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §170-B:4 (1999). From 1987 until the 1999 amendments,
the adoption statute specifically listed homosexuals as individuals not eligible to adopt. See
112 See 530 A.2d 21, 22, 26 (NAL 1987).
113
 See id. at 23.
114
 See id. at 24.
113 See id. at 23, 24.
115 Id. at 25.
117 See In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.24 at 26.
116 See N.H. Rev. STAT. ANN. 4 170-B:4 (1909).
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be recognized based on fitness, not "prejudicial assumptions."'" The
court's reasoning, that barring homosexuals from adopting promotes
the child's welfare, is now undermined by the subsequent legislative
actions.
Soon after New Hampshire's repeal of its ban, however, two other
states enacted laws that effectively bar adoptions by homosexuals. 12° In
March 2000, the Utah state legislature enacted a law that denies adop-
tions to all unmarried cohabitants."' The law defines "living together"
as being in a sexual relationship. 122
 The legislative findings state that it
is not in a child's best interest to he adopted by persons who are co-
habitating in a relationship that is not a legally binding and valid mar-
riage under the laws of the state. 123 Utah law prohibits same-sex cou-
ples from marrying and thus the new adoption law effectively
precludes homosexual couples who live together from adopting. 124
The Mississippi legislature similarly passed a law prohibiting gay
couples from adopting children. 126 The law, which became effective
July 1, 2000, explicitly states, "adoption by couples of the same gender
is prohibited."126 Supporters of the law stated that the bill was
prompted by the recognition of civil unions in Vermont and a belief
that family values do not coincide with homosexual relations as an
appropriate lifestyle. 127
IL EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION TO ILLEGITIMATE
CHILDREN
A. A Brief Overview of Equal Protection Analysis
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution limits governmental discrimination by
classification of people, and requires that no state shall "deny to any
119 See N.N. Law Repeals Ban on Gay Adoptions, BosToN GLOBE, May 4,1999, at B5 (quot-
ing Governorfeanne Shaheen).
' 20 See Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3 (2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1.9 (2000).
121 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1 (2000).
'22 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1(3) (b) (2000).
123 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-9 (2000).
124 See Dennis Romboy, Adoption Measure Faces Uphill Battle, DESERT NEWS (UTAH), Mar.
2,2000, at Al2.
123 SeeGina Holland, Mississippi Legislature Passes Ban on Adoptions by Gay Couples, BATON
ROUGE ADVOCATE, Apr. 21,2000, at 7B.
126 See id,
127 see id.
July 20001	 Children of Same-Sex Partners 	 897
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 128 The
clause has been interpreted to require the government to treat each
individual with equal regard. 129 Thus, equal protection denim& that
courts scrutinize and possibly invalidate disadvantageous legislative
and administrative classifications which reflect a preference based on
prejudice. 1"
In evaluating an equal protection challenge, courts employ a
tiered analysis of scrutiny, depending upon the nature of the
classification involved. 131 Courts will apply strict judicial scrutiny to
any governmental action that involves the classification of a suspect
class or the potential impairment of a fundamental right. 132 Under
this strict scrutiny, a court will not uphold the classification unless it is
necessary to promote a compelling state interest. 133 In addition, the
state must prove that the classification was narrowly tailored to ad-
dress the compelling state interest. 134 If the classification from gov-
ernmental action is not based on suspect criteria or if it does not im-
pair a fundamental right, the courts apply the rational basis test—a
lower standard of judicial review.'" Under rational basis scrutiny,
courts uphold the classification so long as the classification is ration-
ally related to a constitutionally permissible state interest.'"
The Supreme Court recently has begun to employ a third level of
judicial scrutiny that falls between the two aforementioned extremes:
intermediate judicial scrutiny. 137 Intermediate scrutiny involves a
more exacting examination than the rational basis test, yet it is less
rigorous than strict scrutiny)" Under intermediate scrutiny,
classifications must serve important governmental interests and must
be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.'"
128
 &TU.& CoNtsT. amend. XIV, § 1; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1981).
129 See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1438 (2d ed. 1988).
150 See id. at 1438-39; see also Martin(' Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235, (1995);
Clark v. jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
151 See Clark, 486 U.S. at 461; City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432, 439-40 (1985).
152 See Clark, 486 U.S. at 461; Adarand, 515 U.S. at 216.
155 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1967). Classifications based on race or
nationality are inherently suspect and subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Sec Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
151 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224.
155 See Clark, 486 U.S. at 461; Ply/Pc 457 U.S. at 216.
w' See TR/BE, supra note 129, at 1440. Such 'classificai ions are presumed valid and must
be wholly arbitrary to be invalid. See id.
155 See Clark, 486 U.S. at 461.
156
 See id.
39 See id.
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B. United States Supreme Court Decisions Addressing Classifications of
Illegitimate Children
Legislative or administrative classifications based on legitimacy or
gender have been found by the United States Supreme Court to be
quasi-suspect and thus subject to intermediate judicial scrutiny."°
Thus, although illegitimacy may not be labeled a "suspect"
classification, the Court exercises a heightened, intermediate scrutiny
in most cases involving classifications of illegitimate children and ac-
cordingly strikes down many illegitimacy classifications."' The Court
employs this closer scrutiny because the denial of rights to children
based on the status of their birth is unjust. 142
In 1968, in Levy v. Louisiana, the United States Supreme Court
struck down a law that denied illegitimate children the right to re-
cover a wrongful death claim for a parent, while permitting legitimate
children a wrongful death cause of action."3 The Court found the law
constituted invidious discrimination against illegitimate children and
was therefore unconstitutional.'" In Levy, five illegitimate children
sued to recover, under a Louisiana wrongful death statute, for the loss
of their mother, but were denied the right to recover because the
statute applied only to legitimate children.'" The children challenged
the statute under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'" The Supreme Court held that illegitimate children
are "clearly 'persons'" within the meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that an illegitimate child
should not be denied equal rights merely because of his birth out of
wedlock. 147
While the Court in Levy purported to apply a rationality test,'" in
reality the Court exercised a higher level of scrutiny—intermediate
scrutiny—and was not simply deferential to the legislature's interest.'"
140 See Clark, 486 U.S. at 461; Weber v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172-73
(1972).
141 See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 725 (13th
ed. 1997).
142 See Webet; 406 U.S. at 175.
145 See391 U.S. 68, 69-70 (1968).
144 See id. at 69, 72.
145 See id. at 69-70.
140 See id. at 70.
See id. at 70, 72.
148 See Levy, 391 U.S. at 71. This test is whether the discrimination against this class of
children was rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. See id.
149 See id. at 71-72; Nayo, supra note 14, at 73.
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In striking down the, statute, the Court noted the importance of the
intimate, familial relationship between a child and his own mother, 15°
and reasoned that the wrong inflicted on the mother had no relation
to the illegitimacy of the children, 151 Thus, the Court held that deny-
ing illegitimate children the right to recover for the wrongful death of
a parent was not substantially related to the state's interest in discour-
aging children born out of wedlock. 152 The Court, in holding the
wrongful death statute unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause, thus laid the groundwork for treating discrimination against
illegitimate children as unconstitutional unless substantially related to
an important government interest. 153
Following Levy, the Court, in 1972, applied an intermediate scru-
tiny test and struck down a worker's compensation statute that dis-
criminated against unacknowledged illegitimate children in Weber v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.1 54 The Louisiana worker's compensation
law did not recognize illegitimate children who were not legally ac-
knowledged by their deceased parent, but provided worker's compen-
sation benefits to acknowledged children. 155 Thus the statute func-
tioned to treat unacknowledged illegitimate children as a class with
lesser status than the legitimate Children of the same parent. 156 As a
result, four legitimate children were awarded the maximum allowable
compensation for their father's death, while the two illegitimate chil-
dren, from the same father, received nothing. 157
The Court in Weber found that while the worker's compensation
statute was enacted in part to prOtect and promote "legitimate family
relationships," 58 such a statute would not deter illicit relations or the
conception of illegitimate children. 159 The Court reasoned that the
15'' See Levy, 391 U.S. at 71.
151 See id. at 72.
152 See id.
151 See Id.
1 " See 406 U.S. at 175-76.
155 See id. at 165-66.
155 See id. at 164-66.
157 See id. at 165. In this case, the Court clearly acknowledged the stricter scrutiny:
"Though the latitude given state economic and social regulation is necessarily broad, when
state statutory classifications approach sensitive and fundamental personal rights, this
Court exercises a stricter scrutiny." Id. at 172.
155 See Met; 406 U.S. at 173.
1 " See id. The Court. in Weber noted that the father of the illegitimate children was un-
able to legitimize them because acknowledgement required him to be married to their
mother; however, he was married to another women. See id. at 171 11.9. Thus, there was
nothing the parent could do to change the childrens' status. See id.
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statute unjustly burdened a child who was not responsible for the cir-
cumstances of his birth and stated that "when [a] state N] statutory
classifications approach sensitive and fundamental personal rights,
this Court exercises a stricter scrutiny.” 188 The Court concluded that
penalizing the illegitimate child was an ineffectual—as well as unjust–
way of deterring the parent. 181 Thus, the Court held the Louisiana
worker's compensation statute's denial of rights to illegitimate chil-
dren was in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, as the
classification of illegitimate children bore no significant relationship to
any legitimate state interest. 182
The Court continued to recognize classifications of illegitimate
children as quasi-suspect in its 1977 decision, Trimble v. Gordon. 165 In
Thmble, the United States Supreme Court struck down a probate stat-
ute, holding that a government classification based on illegitimacy
must bear more than a mere rational relationship to a legitimate state
purpose. 16" In Tthnble, an illegitimate daughter was denied intestate
succession from her father after his death, based on her illegiti-
macy. 188
 While children born out of wedlock were only able to inherit
from their birth mother under the intestate laws of Illinois, children
born in wedlock could inherit by intestate succession from both par-
ents. 188 Applying an intermediate scrutiny test, the Court found that
the State's purported interest in promoting legitimate family relation-
ships was not significantly related to the sanctions imposed on the
children born of illegitimate relationships. 187
 The Court asserted that
in a case concerning children's rights, the Equal Protection Clause
requires more than the "mere incantation of a proper state pur-
pose:188
 The Court further reasoned that a State should not attempt
to influence actions of adults by punishing their children. 188 Thus,
because the State's interest in promoting legitimate family arrange-
H4 See Weber; 406 U.S. at 172,175.
151 See id. at 175.
' 62 See id. at 176.
163 430 U.S. 762,767 (1977).
16-$ See id. at 776. The Court reasoned that although classifications based on illegitimacy
do not require "our most exacting scrutiny," the scrutiny to such classifications "is not a
toothless one." Id. at 767.
165 See Trimble, 430 U.S. at 763-65.
166 See id. at 764-65.
167 See id. at 770,776.
168 See id. at 769.
169
 See id.
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ments failed to justify the unequal treatment of illegitimate children,
the Court found the probate statute unconstitutional.'"
Finally, in 1988 the United States Supreme Court explicitly held
that an intermediate level of scrutiny was appropriate for
classifications of illegitimate children, in Clark v. jeterl" In Clark, an
illegitimate child was prohibited from establishing her father's pater-
nity for support ten years after her birth, because of Pennsylvania's
six-year statute of limitations for paternity actions.'" The petitioner
raised an equal protection challenge because Pennsylvania did not
impose a time limit on the right of a legitimate child to sue for sup-
port)" The Court acknowledged that a heightened scrutiny analysis
was appropriate for classifications of illegitimate children, and de-
clared that the time limitation must be substantially related to the
State's interest in ,avoiding the litigation of stale claims. 174 The Court
found that the six-year time limit was unreasonable, in light of the fact
that increasingly sophisticated scientific tests are available to establish
paternity regardless of the child's age.'" Engaging in heightened
scrutiny, the Court held that the statutory classification of illegitimate
children was not substantially related to an important state objective,
and thus was unconstitutional.'"
III. CHILDREN OF HOMOSEXUAL PARENTS ARE DENIED ESSENTIAL
RIGHTS WHEN SECOND-PARENT ADOPTIONS ARE PROHIBITED
While most court decisions regarding second-parent adoptions
focus on the tights of the adopting parents, the courts often fail to
address the rights and protections being denied children when sec-
ond-parent adoptions are prohibited)" Legal recognition of both
homosexual parents of a child affects not only a sense of family stabil-
ity and social acceptance, but also provides significant legal rights and
170 See nimble, 430 U.S. at 770,775-76,
171 See 486 U.S. at 461.
in See id. at 457-58.
173 See id. at 458.
174 See id. at 461.
173 See id. at 463-65. The Court also explained that six years may he unreasonable be-
cause the mother may be unwilling to file a paternity action on behalf of her child because
of a relationship with the natural father, the emotional strain of having an illegitimate
child or from the desire to avoid community or family disapproval. See Clark, 486 U.S. at
463. Farther, financial difficulties are likely to increase after the six-year limitation as a
child matures and incurs expenses for clothing, school, and medical care. See id, at 464.
176 See id. at 465,
177 See Glennon, supra note 7, at 280,281.
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financial securities for the child. 178 As family status in all but one
state 179 is typically defined by marriage, the children of homosexual
parents in all other states where homosexual partners are legally
barred from maiming- are denied many benefits and rights that chil-
dren of heterosexual parents receive under the law. 18° The financial
benefits denied include rights under intestacy laws, support claims,
health insurance proceeds and social security benefits in case of a
parent's disability or death."' Without legal recognition of the adop-
tive parent, the child's emotional relationship with the second-parent
also may lack the security of a heterosexual parent-child . relation-
ship. 182 If the homosexual parents separate, the unrecognized parent
has neither support obligations nor custody and/or visitation
rights. 183
 Thus, upon separation of the parents, the child could be de-
nied any further contact with a second parent with whom they have
developed a psychological parent-child relation.' 84 Furthermore, in
the event of the primary parent's death, it may be difficult for the
child to remain with, or even maintain any contact with, the other
parent if the law does not recognize the family relationship.' 88 This
often results in traumatic upheaval and disruption for the child who
has lost one parent and is faced with the prospect of being taken away
from the only other person they trust as a parent. 136
178
 See generally id. at 281; Julia Frost Davies, Two Moms and a Baby: Protecting the Nontradi-
tional Family Through Second-Parent Adoptions, 29 NEW ENG. L. REv. 1055, 1074-77 (1995)
(explaining that children of homosexual parents are given a legal guarantee of support,
inheritance, health benefits and other legal rights from only one parent, white children of
heterosexual unions are guaranteed that these obligations will be imposed for their benefit
on two parents).
179 See 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91 (H. 847).
IN See, e.g., Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 320-21 (Mass. 1993); Adoption of
B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Vt. 1993).
lo See Epstein & Mukherjee, supra note 18, at 809-10. Children who are born to het-
erosexual parents are not denied these benefits because courts recognize a child to have a
mother and father even if the parents choose not to marry. See id.
182 See generally Polikoff, supra note 5, at 523-27 (noting that providing stability in the
home and in the relationship between the child and both parents protects the future of
the child and thus is in the child's best interests).
t5 See Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 320-21; Polikoff, supra note 5, at 533-41.
164
 See Polikoff, supra note 5, at 534-38, 542.
I" See id. at 527-33. In her article, Polikoff discussed three cases in which after the
death of the biological mother, the surviving non-biological mother was faced with custody
claims made by a third party related to the biological mother. See id. While the surviving
lesbian mother ultimately prevailed, Polikoff points out that had she received legal paren-
tal status site would have had automatic custody, which could have prevented the children
from the trauma of being the subject of litigation. See id. at 527.
186
 See id. at 527.
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IV. COURTS' REFUSAL TO GRANT CHILDREN OF HOMOSEXUAL
PARENTS LEGAL PROTECTIONS VIOLATES THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Children of homosexual parents are denied the legal benefits
accorded by law to children of heterosexual parents. 187 The Supreme
Court, however, has protected illegitimate children from discrimina-
tion based on the status of their birth, reasoning that these children
are not responsible for their birth and are powerless to alter their
status. 188 Courts reviewing denials of second-parent adoption to ho-
mosexual parents should apply the intermediate scrutiny employed by
the Supreme Court to strike down laws that discriminate against ille-
gitimate children. 199 Children born to homosexual parents are analo-
gous to children born out of wedlock. These children—like illegiti-
mate children—are not responsible for the circumstances of their
birth and have no control over their parents' marital status or con-
duct.190 FUrthermore, because homosexual parents are unable to
marry legally, children born to homosexual parents are born illegiti-
mate. 191
The children of homosexual parents are denied protections of
legal recognition of the parent-child relationship based on their par-
ent's persona) characteristics. 192 Both the courts that have refused to
permit second-parent adoptions and the state statutes that 'expressly
prohibit homosexuals from adopting base such decisions on the sex-
ual orientation of the parent. 195 The child of homosexual parents,
however, shoulders the burden of such decisions. 194
Since the children of homosexual couple's interests are un-
doubtedly implicated by the denial of second-parent adoptions, 195
187 See generally Adoption of T.K.J. and K.A.K., 931 P.2d 448, 492 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996);
Adoption of Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2t1 1071, '1073 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998); Angel Lace M. v.
Terry M., 516 N.W.2t1 678, 684-85 (Wis. 1994).
188 See Clark v. Joel; 486 U.S. 456, 961 (1988); Weber v. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., 406 U.S.
164, 175 (1971).
189 See Clark, 486 U.S. at 461.
19° See Trimble v. Cordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977).
11 Children born to homosexual parents fall within the definition of an illegitimate
child. BLACK'S LAW DIcrioNARy 747 (6th ed. 1990). An illegitimate child is "A child who is
horn at a time when his parents, though alive, arc not married to each Wier."
192 See Adoption °Bane Doe, 719 N.E.2d at 1073; Angel Lace, 516 N.W.2d at 682.
195 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-9 (2000); Gina Holland, Musgrove Signs Gay Adoption
Ban: Court Battle is Expected, TIIE COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Utah), May 4, 2000 at DS6; see also
In re Opinion of the justices, 530 A.2d 21, 24-25 (N.H. 1987).
194 See Glennon, supra note 7, at 257-59.
195 See infra notes 177-186 and accompanying text.
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they become a burdened class as compared to children born to het-
erosexual families, 196 The only difference between these two classes of
children is the sexual orientation of their parents. 197 Therefore, the
denial to children of homosexual parents the legal rights that are ac-
corded to children of heterosexual parents is a discriminatory
classification. Such a classification—based on a child's being born to
homosexual parents—should be subject to a more heightened scru-
tiny, because the rights involve an intimate, familial relationship be-
tween a child and a parent. 08 These classifications of innocent chil-
dren who are in no way responsible for the status of their birth
approach sensitive and personal fundamental rights for which the
Court applies a more exacting scrutiny. 09
V. DENIALS OF SECOND-PARENT ADOPTIONS ARE NOT SUBSTANTIALLY
RELATED TO A LEGITIMATE STATE INTEREST
Much of the reasoning by courts prohibiting second-parent adop-
tions is based on the state's interest in protecting the traditional "uni-
tary family' 2013
 or to promote the child's best interests. 201 The state's
interest in maintaining traditional unitary families burdens children
because they are not responsible for the status of their birth. Moreo-
ver, promoting unitary families is not a legitimate state interest. Fur-
ther, while the courts purport to be concerned with the best interests
of the child, the decisions preventing second-parent adoptions may, in
fact, have the opposite effect. 202
A. Protecting the Traditional, Unitary Family is Not a Legitimate State
Interest
Courts that have failed to permit second-parent adoptions often
do so under a strict interpretation of their state's adoption statutes.203
These courts interpret the state adoption statutes to permit second-
196 See Weber; 406 U.S. at 175.
197 See generally Davies, supra note 178, at 1075-78.
196 See id at 176; Levy v. Louisiana, 301 U.S. 68, 72 (1968).
199 See Weber; 406 U.S. at 172.
20° See Angel Lace, 516 N.W.2d 678, 686 (Wis. 1991).
201 See Adoption of Tannny, 619 N.E.2d 315, 318 (Mass. 1993); Adoptions of 13.1..V.B.
and E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1273 (Vt. 1993).
202
 See, e.g., Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 320; Adoption of a Child by J.NI.C., 632
A.2d 550, 551-52, 554-55 (N.J. Super. Ct. Cll. Div. 1993); Adoption of B.L. V.B., 628 A.2(1 at
1275-76.
2°5See Angel Lace, 516 N.W.2(1 at 681.
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parent adoption only when the biological parents of the children
terminate all of their legal parental rights—as in the context of step-
parent adoptions. 204 Courts, such as the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
Angel Lace, reason that strict interpretation of the statute is necessary
to support the state's interest in protecting the traditional family
unit.205 Under this interpretation, the state permits adoption without
terminating parental rights only when the parties are married, thus
encouraging marital commitments and purportedly discouraging
formation of families out of wedlock. 206 As a result of such strict con-
structions, courts are in effect punishing the child of homosexual
parents in an effort to deter nonmarital—and thus homosexual—rela-
tions. This treatment of children is analogous to the situation in Weber;
where the Court found that a statute enacted to promote legitimate
family relations was unconstitutional because it unjustly burdened the
child who was not responsible for the circumstances of his or her
birth. 207 Children born to homosexual parents are likewise not re-
sponsible for the circumstances of their birth, and penalizing them is
an equally unjust way of deterring the parent's behavior. 208
Punishing children for being horn into an untraditional family is
contrary to the basic concept of our justice system—legal burdens
should bear some relationship to individual wrongdoing. 2® The Court
in Levy declared unconstitutional a statute where the intent of the
statute had no relation to the illegitimacy of the children and held
that it is invidious to discriminate against children when "no action,
conduct, or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant" to the interest
trying to be protected. 210 Similarly, in Trimble, the Court found that
the state's interest in promoting legitimate family relationships was
not substantially related to the sanctions imposed on the blameless
child born out of wedlock and thus held the statute unconstitu-
tional. 2 " Children have no choice with respect to the family arrange-
ment in which they are born—including children born to homosex-
ual parents—and therefore, the state cannot attempt to influence
actions of adults by punishing their children.212
2°4 See id.
205 See id. at 686,
2'96 See id. at 682-83.
267 See Weber; 406 U.S. at 175,
208 See id. at 173; Adoption of 13,L,V13., 628 A.2(1 at 1275-76.
voSee Levy, 391 U.S. at 72.
20See id.
211 See TriM1)1C V. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 768, 770 (1977).
212 See id. at 770 (citation omitted).
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Denying second-parent adoptions under the guise of trying to
protect "traditional" families is not only unjust because it penalizes
children for circumstances beyond their control, it also is unrealistic
and ineffectual because such denials will not change the fact that such
family structures exist. As the New Jersey court in Adoption of a Child by
J.M.G. reasoned, recognizing—or not recognizing—the parent-child
relation does not alter the family structure. 213 The child-parent rela-
tion with both homosexual partners will continue to exist regardless
of the judiciary's decision to legally protect the relation. 214
 Since chil-
dren have no control in the circumstances of their birth, denying
them legal protections will not discourage the creation of nontradi-
tional families. 215 Thus, denial of second-parent adoptions does not
further the goal of protecting traditional, unitary farnilies. 215 Because
the state interest cannot be furthered by discriminatory treatment of
children of homosexual parents, the classification is not significantly
related to a legitimate state interest. 217
Finally; protecting traditional unitary families may no longer be a
legitimate state interest. Many thriving families today do not conform
to the one-mother/one-father mode1. 2" The state's interest in pre-
serving traditional families is becoming more strained and artificial.
Nontraditional unitary families are becoming as prevalent and impor-
tant as traditional families, and the state should not protect one family
structure above others.20
 The courts' refusal to recognize new family
relationships is not founded on a legitimate state interest and under
an intermediate scrutiny, the discriminatory claSsifications of children
of homosexual parents, as a class, are unconstitutional. 22°
B. Promoting the Best Interests of the Child is not Accomplished by Denial of
Second-Parent Adoptions
Courts that strike second-parent adoption petitions based on the
premise of promoting the child's best interests are in fact denying the
child many benefits and protections created by a legal parent-child
2 ' 3.See 632 A.2d at 551-52.
214 See Polikoff, supra note 5, at 543-44, 572.
215 see id.
216 See id. at 551.
217 See B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d at 1275.
218 SeePolikoff, supra note 5, at 573.
219 See id.; see also Adoption of B, L. V B., 628 A.2d at 1276.
226 See id.
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relation. 221
 These courts often rely upon generalized beliefs of gay
and lesbian parenting rather than individualized determinations of
the best interests of children in cases that conic before them. 222 The
interest in promoting the welfare of the child is therefore not fur-
thered by denying second-parent adoptions, and thus, such decisions
are not significantly related to a legitimate state interest.223
Court decisions and legislative enactments that deny second-
parent adoptions are based on myths about homosexuality and sub-
jective morality judgments. 224 For example, in Opinion of the Justices,
the New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld an irrebutable statutory
presumption that homosexuals are unfit to serve as adoptive parents
based on the assumption that homosexuals are improper role models
for children.225 Although the law has since been overturned by the
New Hampshire legislature, 226 the New Hampshire court reasoned
that prohibiting homosexual adoptions promoted children's welfare
by preventing the confusion and social complexities that exposure to
a homosexual lifestyle could produce. 227 Today, adoption in New
Hampshire is based on individual fitness, not prejudicial assumptions.
The New Hampshire legislature • and governor recognized that fear
and ignorance was the foundation of the law prohibiting adoption by
homosexuals. 228 Supporters of the repeal admitted that "[b]ecause of
the ignorance, discrimination, and prejudice of [the New Hampshire]
[I] egislature, the ... children of New Hampshire have suffered." 229
The findings published in the Utah statute prohibiting unmar-
ried cohabitating couples from adopting similarly make the assump-
tion that it is not in a child's best interest to live with unmarried par-
ents, considering the moral climate of the situation, 230 The legislature
provides generalized, unsupported conclusions that parents who are
cohabitating and unmarried are not fit to raise a child in a healthy,
safe environment."' The Florida District Court of Appeal in Cox I
221
 Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 318, 320; Adoption by J.AL G., 632 A.2(1 at 551,554—
55; Adoption of B,L.V.B., 628 A.2(1 at 1275,1276
222 See Cox I, 627 So. 2d 1210,1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. Apr); 1993); In re Opinion of the Jus-
tices, 530 A.2d 21,25 (N.H. 1987); see also Polikolf, supra note 5, at 572.
225 See Cox 1, 627 So. 2d at 1220.
224 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-9 (2000); Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d at 23,25.
225 See Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2c1 at 23,25.
220 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17043:4 (2000).
227 See Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d at 23-24.
228See N.H. Set to Repeal Ban on Gay Adoptions, THE REconn (N.H.), Apr. 23,1999, at 132.
229 See id. (quoting Sc". Katie Wheeler).
23° See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-9 (2000).
281 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-9 (2000).
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likewise declared that adoptions by homosexuals were not in the best
interests of the child. 232 Rather than showing any evidence supporting
its assumption, the Cox court supported such a conclusion by pointing
out that there was no reliable evidence to counter this conclusion.'"
Thus, without any evidence that homosexual parents are unfit or may
detrimentally impact their children, the court upheld a statute deny-
ing homosexual's adoption based on stereotypes and an unsupported
correlation between sexual orientation and the ability to parent.'"
In contrast to the sweeping, unsupported conclusions of these
state courts and legislatures, it is often in the best interest of the child
to have the parental relationships with both parents legally. recog-
nized. 235
 First, the source of homosexuality is still inadequately under-
stood.236 In their generalizations about homosexuals' parenting abil-
ity, neither the Florida District Court of Appeal nor the Utah or
Mississippi legislatures were able to point to conclusive evidence sup-
porting a conclusion that homosexual parents were unfit to be par-
ents. 237
 Second, regardless of whether a second-parent adoption is
permitted, a court's ruling will not deter the formation of families
that are comprised of homosexual parents and their children. 2" Re-
productive technology and the existence of homosexual couples will
not disappear but rather will continue to develop with increasing
numbers of children living in these nontraditional families.'" Thus,
courts' denial of second-parent adoptions only frustrates the child's
interests and deny children the many legal protections and benefits
that are accorded to heterosexual parent-child relationships. 240
Protection of a child's relationship with both parents—whether
heterosexual or homosexual—is in the child's interest. 241
 The Massa-
chusetts court in Adoption of Tammy recognized this, noting that deny-
232 See Cox 1, 627 So.2d at 1220.
233 see id.
21 See Markey, supra note 2, at 745-46.
256
 See Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 318, 320; Adoption try .I.M.G., 632 A.2t1 at 551,
554-55; Adoption of B.L.V.13,, 62$ A.2d at 1275, 1276; see also Glention, supra note 7, at 258-
59, 277-79.
236 See Opinion of thejustices, 530 A.2d at 25.
237 See UTAH CODE ANN. 78-30-9 (2000); Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Scrvs. v. Cox, 627 So.2d 1210,1213 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Carlos A. Ball, Waning with
Wardle: Morality, Social Science, and Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1098 U. ILL. L. REV. 253,279-89
(1998); Glennon, supra note 7, at 276-77.
222
 See Adoption byJ.M.G., 632 A.2(1 at 551-52; Adoption of B. L. 1'.B., 628. A.2d at 1276.
239 See Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2(1 at 1276.
20 See infra notes 33-47 and accompanying text.
211 See Adoption of Tanury, 619 N.E.2d at 320-21; Adoption of B.L.V.R., 628 A.2d at 1275.
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ing the second-parent adoption would deprive the daughter of a les-
bian couple the right to inherit from her non-natural mother's family
trust fund—as the inheritance could only he passed to the mother's
legal issue.242 The court permitted the second-parent adoption, stat-
ing that Tammy's best interest is served by ensuring that the child's
relationship with both mothers is protected. 245 In addition to the po-
tential inheritance, the court also noted that it would be best for the
child to have two parents legally obligated to support her, to provide
social security and health insurance benefits and for the child to have
the filial ties to both women preserved in the event of separation or of
the biological mother's death. 244 The court acknowledged that recog-
nizing a parent-child relation is in the child's best interests because of
the rights and protections it affords the child. 245
In other similar state cases permitting second-parent adoptions,
courts have found that legal recognition of the parent-child relation-
ship was essential to promote the welfare of the child. 246 After noting
the financial and emotional benefits a child receives by a legal rela-
tionship with both homosexual parents, the Vermont court in B.L.V.B.
held that denying legal protection of the parent-child relationship is,
as a matter of law, inconsistent with the child's best interests. 247
Moreover, the court recognized that to disallow a legally recognized
relationship with the second parent serves no legitimate state interest
and noted that the court's paramount concern was the effect of the
law on the reality of children's lives. 248 Similarly, the New Jersey court
in Adoption by J.M.G., held that the second-parent adoption was in the
child's best interests because it provided the child critical legal rights
and protections for her financial safety, as well as physical and emo-
tional well being. 249 The court noted the protections accorded to the
child by the legally recognized parent-child relationship and stated
that courts cannot "continue to pretend that there is one formula,
one correct pattern that should constitute a family in order to achieve
the supportive, loving environment ... children should inhabit." 250
242 See Adoption of Tawny, 619 N.E.2cl at 320.
243 See id. at 318, 320-21, 322.
244 See id. at 320-21.
245 See id.
245 Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 318, 320; Adoption by J.A.1.G., 632 A.2c1 at 551, 554-
55; Adoption of B.L. VB., 628 A.2(1 at 1275, 1276.
247 See Adoption of B.L.1 7.B., 628 A.2d at 1276.
245 See id. at 1275-76.
249 See Adoption by .J.M.G., 632 A.2(1 at 551-52.
230 See id. at 554-55.
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In almost all cases, children benefit from legal recognition of the
relationship they share with their second parent. 251 Courts that con-
tinue to deny children a legal parent-child relationship with both ho-
mosexual parents are denying the children the benefits of such a rela-
tionship and thus precluding what may be in their emotional and
economic best interest. Thus, even under the least strict scrutiny—
rational review—the state's denying a child the legal protections of
the parent-child relationship is not rationally related to the state's
interest in promoting the best interest of the child. 252
VI. BEYOND SECOND-PARENT ADOPTIONS: POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS
While second-parent adoptions are a positive step toward ac-
knowledging alternative family situations, progressive steps have been
taken to legally recognize families that are not made up of the tradi-
tional one-mother/one-father mode1. 258
 The state of Vermont took
the historic step in recognizing the rights of same-sex couples. 254 The
Act Relating to Civil Unions provides same-sex families virtually the
same state rights accorded to heterosexual families. 255 While the law
does not extend full equality to the same-sex couple through the
freedom to marry, the civil union law provides protections in inheri-
tance, property division, child custody and support, family leave, and
state tax benefits. 258
Under the civil unions law, a child born to a couple in a civil un-
ion is given equal state benefits and protections as a child born to a
heterosexual parent. 257
 As a result of this new law, children whose
homosexual parents enter into a civil union will have the emotional
and financial security that have been denied to them unless they were
legally adopted by their parent's partner. By being accorded the smile
rights and protections, these children will no longer be discriminated
against because of the status of their birth. 258 Children who are born
251 See, e.g., Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 318, 320; Adoption by J.M.G., 632 A.2d at
554-55; Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d at 1275, 1276; Glennon, supra note 7, at 257-59. In
the rare cases where children will not benefit from the parent-child relation, the courts
should still employ the "best interests" standard and make its determination about the
family structure accordingly.
257 See Glennon, supra note 7, at 258.
255 See 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91 (1-I. 847).
2'" See id.
255 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1204 (2000).
256 See id.
257 See id.
258 See id; see also supra notes 33-47, 240, 246 and accompanying text.
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to same-sex parents in a civil union are legitimate and will not be
treated differently merely because of the sexual orientation of their
parents. 259 Therefore, the enactment of the Civil Union law is a posi-
tive step toward ending the disparate treatment of children born to
same-sex couples in Vermont.
While this unprecedented law has many unsettled questions relat-
ing to whether other states will recognize Vermont's civil unions pro-
tections, it is a positive step in protecting same-sex families. 260
 Because
of the uncertainty surrounding recognition of civil unions in other
states, however, it is still important for second parent adoptions to be
permitted as an option for same-sex couples who have children. Until
all states accord the same rights and benefits to same-sex couples as
heterosexual Couples, second-parent adoptions remain critical to pro-
tect the relationship between same-sex parents and their children. 261
CONCLUSION
Despite the fact that children are not responsible for their birth,
children born to homosexual parents are being punished because of
the legal system's failure to recognize the legitimacy of the relation-
ship between homosexual parents and their children. Courts' refusal
to recognize the existence of these family relations directly harms the
innocent children born to these families, denying them a plethora of
legal rights guaranteed to other children. A strong argument can be
made that punishing children for the actions of the parents is unjust
and unfair treatment, treatment that is violative of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.
The rationale behind court decisions and legislative enactments
denying second-parent adoptions often stems from a disapproval of
homosexual parents' lifestyle. It is not the role of courts and legisla-
ture, however, to make laws based upon the approval or disapproval of
the relationships that seek legal recognition. Whether or not the
members of the judiciary and legislature approve will not change the
reality that children are being born to homosexual parents. As repro-
ductive technologies and alternative families continue to develop, the
legal definition of family must become more accepting of the fact that
@59
	
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 §§ 1201,1204 (2000).
See A Histotic Victory, supra note 65, at 4-6.	 •
261 See id. at 5.
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many different family structures may provide the love, security and
stable environment essential for children.
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